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Biased over 70 years of acquired pnx:onccptions, I will dis-
cuss mainly Philosophical Debates, with occa<>ional refer-
ences to Consciousness Lost and Found. The bottom line is 
that neuropsychologists are more likely to benefit. from Lost 
and Found than from Debates. 
Debates is a profusely footn oted tom~ 1 which provides 
an overview of what three dozen contemporary philoso-
phers, writing in English, have to say about consciousness. 
Readers will be exposed to much meticulo us (even law-
ye rly) argumentation and you may enj oy the self-confident 
manner in which these philosophers make the ir moves and 
countermoves. Consider Lycan, "I a rn not here addressing 
issues of qualia or phenomenal character, wh ich T have re-
solved almost enti rely satisfactorily e lsewhere" (p. 756). 
Some readers may want to k now what Lycan has so hap-
pily resolved . A quale (singular) is a "raw fee l" or " i mme-
diat.e sensation" or "phenomenal experience" and for many 
modem phi losophers it is the indispensable essence of con-
sc iousness? Tn the inde x. to Debates there are more refer-
ences ( 48) to qualia than to anything else including Cartesian 
ma teria lism (21), epiphenomenalism (22) , func lioitalis rn 
( 40), mental states (22), and brain (5). You can get a feel for 
what the word "qualia" means from the contexts in which il 
appears. However, you may not hother if you believe Dan 
Dennett, who in chapter 40 argues that tbere arc no such 
' McGinn' s chapter 33 has a t.exr of l l pages and 3 pages of fnlllnotcs. 
1\nd Gllzelderc 's very helpful intToduc tion l1as 45 pages of text and 22 
pages of footnotes. 
2 Accrm1ing to the O.x.furd Hnxtish Dlcrionury a "quale" (rhymes, al-
most, with folly or good golly) means " the quality of a thing." The OED 
also has qualc (pronounced !ike quail) which means tonncnt or wr turc 
(see also R:1machandran and Hirstein, 1997). 
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things as qualia. Even if there are , Lycan says, "l think qua-
lia problems and the nat.ure of conscious awareness Clre mu-
tually independent and indet:d have little to do with each 
other" (p. 7 56). Nevertheless, chapters 40 to 44 are entirely 
devoted Lo the nature of qualia. 
Debates has fi fty chapters, most of them re printed from 
~rlier publications. There are I 0 section::;, beginning with 
"T. Stream of Consciousness." This starts with a nice selec-
tion from William Ja mes ( 1910) including his picture of 
awan:ness. not as a sharply edged spotb ght but as a more or 
less hell-shaped curve for each consc ious thought, followed 
not by an abrupt transition tn the next thought hut rather by 
an overlap of the three curves: now, just past, and just emerg-
ing, "The waxing and waning brain proct:sses at every mo-
ment blend." The now-thought is surrounded by a halo of 
relationships called by James "the fringe,'' d iscussed in de-
ta il recently by Galin (1 997). Then follows "II. Method -
o logy," which contains Patr icia Churchland's rhetorical 
question entitling chapter 7, "Can neurohiology teach us any-
thing about consc iousness?" She gives reasons why the an -
swer is yes, hul not much, seems to be the answer from most 
of the other philosophers. Section Ill gives us three psy-
chologist~ (Baars, Farah , Sha llice), one neurologist (Bisi-
ach) and two biologists (Crick and Koch). The 1990 essay 
hy Crick and Koch (chapter I 0), once indispensable read-
ing for those interested in the physiology of consciousness, 
has been succeeded hy an article (Crick & Koch, 1998) in 
which they summarize the ir 1990 essay and review more 
recent deve lopments. They reiterate their expectation that 
there will be one, or at most a few consciousness mecha-
nisms; f.arah and Bisiach strongly differ. 
Both Farah and Bisiach cover material (neglect, etc.) al-
ready known to neuropsychologists and conclude that. con- (1 
! I 
II 
,I, 
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sciousness is, in Bisiach's words, "far from being unitary" 
and "rests entirely on a virtual mechanism distributed over 
brain circuits." Farah asserts, "There is currently no evi-
dence for a dedicated awareness system distinct from the 
systems that perform specific perceptual or cognitive func-
tions." By contrast, it seems to others, (Baars, 1993, Shal-
lice, in Debates, chapter 13; Schacter, 1989; Bogen, 1997a) 
that there is evidence for a dedicated awareness system. Time 
will tell. Meanwhile, since no brain mechanism, focal or 
global, for consciousness is yet widely accepted, there seems 
to remain considerable room for the sort of metaphysical 
debates which, before the double helix, dealt with the na-
ture of life. 
After section III, for the remaining 36 chapters it's ha-
rangues and polemics all the way. An example is Dennet's 
fusillade at Ned Block's big idea (distinguishing phenom-
enal consciousness from access consciousness): "I for one 
found it difficult to keep track of the tangle of objections 
and counter objections, exemptions, caveats and promis-
sory notes and will be interested to see if other commenta-
tors can find their way into, and back out of, the maze Block 
has created." Further on, "Block has done my theory a fine 
service: nothing could make [my theory] easier to swallow 
than Block's involuntary demonstration of the pitfalls one 
must encounter if one turns one's back on [my theory] and 
tries to take Block's purported distinction seriously" (p. 417). 
Block is capable of a similar tone: "Harman's primary ar-
gument is, as far as I can see, an appeal to-of all things-
introspection ... an error in philosophical method ... this 
is no way to do philosophy" (p. 429). 
There is a familiar ring to these sallies and ripostes-one 
hears them in court or in depositions as attorneys snap and 
bark at each other during the proceedings, following which 
they all go out for a friendly lunch together. Tyler Burge (in 
chapter 24) supports Block's big idea (that we have two kinds 
of consciousness) but he does it in a style almost entirely 
introspective! Burge fesses up in a fashion rarely found in 
philosophers: "I do not know how to defend this view .... 
But I find it compelling" (p. 429). Burge is also refresh-
ingly frank when he says, "What is important for my pur-
poses is not whether these empirical conjectures are correct 
but that the distinctions mark conceptual possibilities" 
(p. 433). 
Conceptual analysis attains its most monarchial impor-
tance when Frank Jackson suggests that physical explana-
tions of the mental must begin with an a priori account; this 
is another version of the view that one must first adopt a 
metaphysical position before any serious evaluation of data. 
(My favorite counter to this is from Sherrington, 1947, where 
he refers to the greatest neuroanatomist Ramon y Cajal tell-
ing how adnering at one time or another to either dualism or 
materialism seemed to make no difference whatever in his 
practical life.) In chapter 29, Jackson considers how (in-
deed, even whether) mental properties relate to the natural 
world. Thus, even though neuropsychology finds abundant 
evidence for mind have a physical (brain) basis, for Jack-
son and friends this can never be enough. They will insist 
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that an a priori account be given before evidence can be 
considered. Like lawyers who have accepted a retainer, they 
know which side they are on and will not be cowed by the 
facts of the case. 
One of the few philosophers to concern himself with phys-
iology (in this case, of pain) is Michael Tye; but see how he 
does itt Tye considers one of Ned Block's pseudosyllogisms: 
The pain is in my fingertip. 
The fingertip is in my mouth. 
Therefore, the pain is in my mouth. 
He then explains why Block is wrong (to say the word "in" 
is used differently for pain) using the next nine pages. Tye 
is well aware that "pains in the upper left arm are often due 
to disturbances in the heart." And he says, "Pain experi-
ences, if they are anywhere, are in the head." But consider 
his brief reference to the elimination of distress by a frontal 
leukotomy (or cingulotomy): "These reports, even if taken 
at face value, are compatible with the proposal in the text, 
for clearly such cases are abnormal" (footnote 6 on p. 339). 
What boggles is the implication that his explanation of the 
normal should not be affected by data from abnormal cases 
(which would include much of the data from neuropsychol-
ogy). Since any adequate theory of the normal should ex-
plain the abnormal, how can he not be concerned about 
abnormal cases? 
Out at another tail end of the philosophic distribution is 
chapter 28 by Georges Rey, who denies that there is any 
such thing as consciousness, in the sense that, "there would 
seem to be no actual thing or process that our past usages 
have been 'getting at'" (p. 473). He quotes William James 
to the effect that consciousness is not a thing, 3 insisting in-
stead that the word stands for a function. (Most readers of 
this review might agree with that.) However Rey says, 
"When I say there may be no such thing, I mean no such 
thing whatsoever" (p. 479). Among his 132 references there 
are five neuro-refs (Eccles, Luria, Moruzzi, Penfield, and 
Pribram) which he mentions solely for the purpose of shrug-
ging them off. The extent to which many philosophers con-
sider neuropsychological detail is reflected in Lycan's 
assertion: "The central nervous system is as central as it 
gets" (p. 762). 
Flanagan (1992, excerpted in chapter 19) can be reward-
ing because he explains how other philosophers are wrong 
and he does it in a readable style. Unfortunately, even Flana-
gan reveals a surprising neuroignorance. It seems that 
philosophers are still devoting time to whether or not con-
sciousness is epiphenomenal. This is the idea that conscious-
ness is like heart sounds. The sounds can tell us some of 
what is going on in our hearts (just as consciousness can 
tell us some of what is going on in our brains) but the sounds 
don't have any effect on the function of the heart. To ex-
plain epiphenomenality, Flanagan contrasts two pictures: in 
the first, a hot stimulus to the hand causes a feeling of pain 
3 The quotation from James is in footnote 38 (repeat, 38) of Rey. 
368 
which leads to withdrawal of the limb; he calls this "the 
standard view." In the second, the stimulus causes the pain 
and the wlthdmwal in parallel; he calls this (correctly) the 
epiphenomenalist view. The facl is: the second has been "tl1e 
standard view" for over a century. The withdrawal is a spi-
nal retlex and the pain is epiphenomenal for the behavior, 
though likely not for the memory of the occasion (Clark & 
Squire, 1998). 
The reader will have by now recogni:.Gcd some of my pre-
conceptions about consciousness: (1) There is such a thing. 
We routi ncly ascribe consciousness to some entities and not 
others and with fairly widespread agreement. Moreover, we 
labd levels of consciousness for both diagnostic and ther-
apeutic purposes, again with fairly good agreement. (2) Con-
sciousness is produced by brains and is to be understood (so 
far as we can) in naturalistic terms. Weiskrantz in Lost and 
Found thoroughly agrees with these two claims. However, 
there is a third preconception which he avoids: (3) What-
ever the mechanism producing -=onsciousness, it exists in 
duplicate. In each hemisphere exists the machinery for 
consciousness. 
Of course, Weiskrantz know that almos·t all cerebral anitt-
omy 0xisrs in pairs; it is obv.ious in any frontal or horizontal 
section of the cerebrum. However, he gives this readily ob-
servable fact short shrift and he never connects it explicitly 
with the problem of consciousness. Is the duality of atHtt-
omy like the runners of a sleigh, such that if one i s damaged 
or removed the sleigh cannot go? Or is the dual ity more like 
two harnessed horses, su-=h that if one is removed, the re-
maining member of the pair can still pull the sleigh, not as 
fast or as far, hut enough. The answer unquestionably is the 
latter. Otherwise hemispherectomy would not he a routine 
procedure in I 8 of 25 epilepsy centers (Engel, 1993). 
Not only is the cerebral anatomy double, and not only is 
it unargu able that one hemisphere is enough for conscious-
ness; beyond that, two hemispheres following callosolorny 
have been shown to be conscious simultaneously and inde-
pendently. As N agd ( I 971 ) said of the split-bra in , "What 
the right hemisphere can do on its own is too elaborate, too 
intentionally directed, and too psychologically intelligible 
to be regarded merely as u collection of unconscious auto-
matic responses" (p. 403). And, "If the patients did not deny 
awareness of what is being done [by their right hemi-
spheres) no doubts about their consciousness would arise at 
all" (p. 404). This 197 1 paper by Nagel is not included in 
Debates. 
Much of the meandering inconclusiveness of discussions 
on consciousness results from so many different usages of 
the word. However, almost all u sages have in common the 
idea of subjectivity. Hence, I believe: (4) Explaining sub-
jectivity should have priority. Finding a physiologic basis 
for subj ectivity is hard e nough (cf. Dave Chalmers in chap-
ter 22) without trying to explain all the other different stuff 
that people mean or might. mean when they say "conscious-
ness." (5) Mammalian brains have considerable power for 
generali:t.cd computation but ~pecial.functions (e.g., subjec-
tivity) commonly require specialized structures. Such a strue-
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lllre has been disparagingly called a "subjectivity pump" by 
Marcel Kinshourne (1995). Well, that's exactly what some 
of us are looking l~>r. And the mechanism for subjectivity is 
double, as shown by the duality of the anatomy, the success 
of hemispherectomy and the split-brain results (in cats and 
monkeys as well as humuns). 
One of the few philosophers to consider the split-brain 
data thoroughly was Nagel (1971 ). He emphasized a crucial 
consideration: "It may he impossible for us to abandon cer-
tain ways of conceiv i.ng and representing ourselves, no mat-
ter how little support they get from scientific research. This, 
1 suspect, is true of the idea of the unity of a person." Hav-
ing described the split-brain phenomena he continued: "It is 
possible that the ordinary, simple idea of a single person 
will come to seem quaint some day ... but it is also possi-
ble that we .shall he unable to abandon the idea no matter 
what we discover" ( p. 4 1 I )- Furthermore, "If the idea of a 
single mind applies to anyone it applies to ordinary individ· 
uals with intact brains, and if iL does not apply to them it 
ought to be scrapped, in which case there's no point iri ask-
ing whether those with split-brains have one mind or two" 
(p. 409). In fact, the idea of a single mind applies exactly to 
an individual who has had a hemispherectomy (Bogen, I 977, 
1997a). Rut Nagel was oblivious to consciousness after hemi-
spherectomy, and in this he has all of the authors in both of 
these books for company. 
One can ask, "Will reading this book increase my under-
standing of consciousness?" Lost and Found is essential read-
ing for those concerned with blindsight. However i t can not 
yel answer the basic question: why do we need striate cortex 
to be conscious of what we are seeing? Is it because st:Liate cor-
tex get~ hack the visual information from all of the cortical 
areas that process visual information? Or does it send along 
to the other areas some special code which does not accom-
pany the visual information that reaches extra-striate cortex 
directly from I ,QN or pulvinar? Or does striate cortex send 
hack to some subr.ortical region something that is crucial for 
subjectivity? This is the alternative that I favor and it appears 
to be the allernative favored in Lost and Found in which 
Wciskrantz ascribes the availability to consciousness of vi-
sual information to a VORB. By VORB, he means ·'visual oil 
refinery bypass." This refers to pathways that bypass the well 
known block diagram of visual hierarchy proposed by Fell e-
man and van Essen ( 1991 ). which in Lost and Found .is called 
(after Cowey) the "visual oil refinery." 
Tn Part Jr of Henry VI, Dick says, "First, ... kill all the 
lawyers." Why not dispose of lawyers? Because tl1e rule of 
long evolved law stands between us and reversion to the 
inquis ition, trial by combat and the dunking of witches, who 
were proved innocent only if they drowned. Well then, from 
what primitive practices are we protected by philosophers? 
A likely answer: unexamined beliefs. We benefit from their 
exposure of unrecognized assumptions and undisciplined ar-
gument. However, to be truly helpful, they've got to know 
the territory. Judging by Vehate.s, whal many philosophers 
currently have to say leads less to a clarification of con-
sciousness than to its cleverly elaborated obfuscation. 
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Gate, Gate, Paragate ... Where Have All the Flowers Gone? 
Zen and the Brain. J. Austin. 1998. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 844 pp. $40.00. 
Reviewed by JAsoN W. BROWN, MD, New York. 
Readers! Throw away your Shallice, and run to the book-
store for Austin! This magisterial work, an un-Zen-like 844 
pages, divided into 158 chapters, a smorgasbord of remi-
niscences, data, and observations on Buddhism and neuro-
science, interspersed with exercises in Zen meditation. Austin 
preserves by inclusion rather than selection the skepticism 
and dialectic that are the essence of Zen teaching, laying 
out what there is in all its eclectic richness, from Perky to 
Pavlov, from alpha rhythms to syzygy. In its scholarship and 
detachment it is a welcome antidote to the assertive fatuity 
of so much contemporary theory, offering the thesis, even if 
tacitly, that a subjectivism inferred from symptoms, e.g., hal-
lucination, imagery and altered states, is preferable to an 
externalist model of cognition inferred from deficits. 
My only quarrel with the book is that the author, though 
conversant, impressively so, with the puzzles, traps, and in-
tricacies of Zen logic, seems to believe that a dialogue is 
possible without a radical upheaval in the presuppositional 
bases of western science. We crave for east-west coexis-
tence, but the painful truth is that when we move to the meta-
physical core of Zen we leave contemporary psychology far 
behind. Austin is more comfortable with mantras than with 
metaphysics, with questions, mondos, and replies that lead 
to further questions, so he visits this topic rather briefly. 
The result is that the implications for neuroscience of the 
relational standpoint of Zen are unclear, I mean, Zen as meta-
physics not as experience. 
For example, what does it mean for our understanding of 
perception to say, with the Buddhists, that a thing is the set 
of its contrasts, or that the awareness of a blueness is a blue 
awareness, that is, that the object and the apprehension of 
the object comprise the same state, indeed, that the object-
form determines the state of awareness? Here, there is no 
sharp distinction of perception and hallucination (Matilal, 
1986). Austin is very much in this mode of thought, and his 
discussion of imagery can be read with great profit. But our 
neurophysiology is a science of objects and in-processing 
in the primary cortices. What is the neurophysiology of an 
idealist philosophy in which objects exteriorize the valua-
tion and conceptual feeling of mental imagery? 
For Austin, meditation is the primary contact. But there 
is a need to go beyond the experience, to a theory of 
